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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
904.00
-91.00
1 155.00
-5.00
Apr 20
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	904.00	-91.00	1 155.00	-5.00	Apr 20

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
729.47	-5.42	860.51	-4.60	1 386.52	-12.66	Apr 21

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MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)

Correlation between market bunker prices (MBP) and MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	Date
Rotterdam	590	668	-78	660	745	-85	1 155	1 225	-70	Apr 21
Singapore	618	695	-77	680	828	-148	1 242	1 218	+24	Apr 21
Fujairah	579	642	-63	680	797	-117	1 365	1 281	+84	Apr 21
Houston	615	669	-54	814	774	+40	1 075	1 130	-55	Apr 21

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Latest News
- 2026-04-21
  Conservation NGOs call for ‘no biofuels in shipping’
  With the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG) meeting in London this week, a group of conservation NGOs have called on IMO Member States to ‘reject biofuels as a decarbonisation... Read more
- 2026-04-21
  Portland Port awarded licence for LNG STS transfers
  The UK’s Portland Port has announced it has become fully approved to conduct LNG ship-to-ship (STS) transfers. The port, located on the south coast of England, was already fully operational for oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) transfers prior... Read more
- 2026-04-21
  Bunker One supplying ULSFO by barge in Bremerhaven
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- 2026-04-21
  Enagás wraps up sale of 40% stake in renewable hydrogen business Lesley Bankes-Hughes 21 April 2026 Spanish energy group Enagás
  Spanish energy group Enagás has completed the sale of 40% of Enagás Renovable to hydrogen investor Hy24 for €48 million and will retain a 20% stake in the affiliate. Since its inception in 2019, the business focus of Enagás Renovable has been to promote... Read more
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  Asia-based consortium undertakes carbon capture hub study
  Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K” LINE) is one of the members of a consortium which is undertaking a pre-feasibility study to assess the development of Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) hubs across Asia to support hard-to-abate sectors. The consortium... Read more
- 2026-04-21
  Peninsula celebrates 30th anniversary
  From its inception in 1996 as a small marine energy supplier based in Gibraltar, over three decades Peninsula has grown to be a global company with 21 commercial offices and a network of over 50 strategic physical supply ports and storage facilities,... Read more
- 2026-04-21
  NGOs call on EC to reaffirm commitment to EU Methane Regulation
  In an open letter published today (21 April), a group of environmental NGOs have called on the European Commission (EC) and European Union (EU) Member States to reaffirm their commitment to a ‘timely implementation’ of the EU Methane Regulation updates,... Read more
- 2026-04-21
  Oil falls on expectations US-Iran talks likely to proceed, opening supply
  Oil prices fell on Tuesday, reversing gains in the previous session, on expectations peace talks between the U.S. and Iran will take place this week and allow more supply to flow from the key Middle East producing region. Brent crude futures declined... Read more Oil prices fell on Tuesday, reversing gains in the previous session, on expectations peace talks between the U.S. and Iran will take place this week and allow more supply to flow from the key Middle East producing region.
  Brent crude futures declined 54 cents, or 0.6%, at $94.94 a barrel at 0300 GMT. U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) for May fell $1.11, or 1.2%, to $88.50. The May contract expires on Tuesday and the more-active June contract was down 76 cents, or 0.9%, at $86.66.
  Both benchmarks surged on Monday, with Brent up 5.6% and WTI up 6.9%, after Iran again shut the Strait of Hormuz, closing the key oil transport artery, and the U.S. seized an Iranian cargo ship as part of its blockade of the country’s ports.
  Still, investors are focusing on the likelihood talks this week will result in the extension of the existing ceasefire or a final agreement, though the chance of further conflict and disruptions to oil flows remains.
  "While energy markets popped higher yesterday following Iran’s decision to reverse its opening of the Strait of Hormuz, they’re still trading in a manner which suggests optimism over U.S.-Iran talks," said ING analysts in a note.
  "But we believe markets are underpricing the ongoing supply disruption. Optimism appears to be clouding the reality of the supply shock."
  Iran is weighing participation in peace talks in Pakistan, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Monday, following Islamabad’s efforts to end the U.S. blockade.
  
  The blockade has posed a major hurdle to Tehran rejoining peace efforts, with the current two-week ceasefire set to expire this week.
  "We continue to lean toward an MOU being signed and/or the ceasefire being extended this week, potentially evolving into a broader agreement," Citi analysts said in a note. "That said, we remain prepared to pivot toward a more protracted disruption scenario should negotiations falter this week."
  Underscoring the uncertainty around the talks, the Iranian official stressed that no decision has been made to attend, as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said "continued violations of the ceasefire" by the U.S. is a hindrance to further negotiations.
  Separately, Iran’s top negotiator and Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf reiterated that Tehran would not negotiate under threats.
  Shipping activity through the Strait of Hormuz, a corridor for about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply, remained limited on Monday.
  If disruptions to the strait persist for another month, total losses could rise to about 1.3 billion barrels, with prices likely near $110 a barrel in the second quarter of 2026, Citi said.
  Kuwait declared force majeure on oil shipments due to the strait’s blockade, Bloomberg News reported.
  The higher prices caused by the closure of the strait have cut oil demand by about 3% so far, analysts at Societe Generale said in a client note.
  The risk is "skewed toward larger losses the longer normalisation is delayed," it said, adding it expects "full normalisation" to supply only by late 2026. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2026-04-21
  Oil Is No Longer Trading Like a Market
  The oil market is heading into unknown spaces. To paraphrase Starship Enterprise, “Oil markets ('Space' the final frontier. These are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. Its 5-year mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new... Read more The oil market is heading into unknown spaces. To paraphrase Starship Enterprise, “Oil markets ('Space' the final frontier. These are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. Its 5-year mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no man has gone before”. As we can now see, there is a moment in every crisis when the language of markets, which is normally based on price discovery, marginal barrels, and supply-demand balance, quietly but dangerously stops making sense. For the oil markets, that moment has now passed. We are now witnessing a tight market, and not a disrupted one, but a real-time structural breakdown of the very mechanisms that have governed global energy flows for decades, fundamentally altering market dynamics and stability.
  
  This should not have come as a surprise, as analysts have been warning for years that the global oil framework is increasingly fragile, as it is not only reliant on a handful of chokepoints but also on a logistical architecture built on the perception or expectation of uninterrupted flows. For most oil market pundits, even in the most pessimistic scenarios, the ruling assumption (or the most comforting one ) was still that the price would act as the ultimate balancing mechanism. Conventional theories all pointed out that higher prices would incentivize supply, dampen demand, and restore equilibrium. Reality at present is that this assumption is now being tested to destruction, exposing the danger of overdependence on price signals alone in a fragile structure.
  
  While some are still regarding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as just another geopolitical disruption, as we see in statements and strategic policies of global leaders, especially in the EU, it should now be regarded as the removal, not relevant if this is partial or near-total, of the world’s single most critical artery in the global energy landscape. Yes, we all know that roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG flows normally transit this narrow waterway, with a current loss of over 13 million bpd. This loss is not a volume that the market can absorb through price signals alone, underscoring the potential for widespread supply disruptions and market instability.
  
  Financial markets have, at present, deceptively muted the immediate effects. Oil prices have fluctuated, even softened at times, which should be seen or assessed as a persistent disbelief among traders that the disruption is real, sustained, and structurally damaging. Reality, especially beneath the surface, is showing a much bleaker, even pitch-dark picture, while the physical market is telling a very different story. At present, European and Asian refinery runs are not reduced due to demand destruction but because feedstock is not available. More attention should be paid to developments in storage, as storage levels are being drawn down at an accelerating rate. This is not only crude oil but also increasingly petrochemical products. The whole market is currently cannibalizing itself.
  
  Politicians, policymakers, and financials should start to understand that they have several critical misunderstandings. The first one is that reduced refinery throughput is not evidence of weakening demand. Current markets show the opposite, as it is clear that it is a symptom of constrained supply chains. Europe’s refineries are now caught between a rock and a hard place, as they already operate in a structurally tight environment due to years of underinvestment and the loss of Russian barrels. The Iran war and Hormuz are now putting refineries under additional strain. On the other side of the globe, Asian refiners, especially those in import-dependent economies such as South Korea and India, have already entered a phase in which procurement strategies are shifting from optimization to survival.
  
  Timelines at present clearly matter more than headlines. It should be understood that crude oil is not delivered instantly. Until now, refineries have been able to sustain their runs using barrels that were largely loaded weeks ago, before the latest escalation. For European and Asian refineries and markets, when these shipments are discharged and consumed, the reality will become very visible, as there will be no replacement cargoes. By early May, which is an optimistic scenario, the illusion of normalcy will begin to fracture. By mid-May, it will be gone.
  
  Policymakers should also reassess the status of their inventories. Market indicators show that these inventories, which are the last buffer, are far thinner than is currently admitted. OECD commercial stocks have been declining for months and are now approaching operational minimums. The call for another SPR release will be heard, but even this can only provide temporary relief. This will definitely not be a substitute for sustained flows. Optimism about the USA is also unfounded. In the media, the United States is often seen as the swing supplier of the market, but it has already constrained itself. Export capacity is finite, and domestic political pressure is already building to prioritize internal supply over global markets. We are also not talking about an American oil and gas company, but individual players (with shareholders).
  
  A second uncomfortable reality is that we are looking in real time at the fragmentation of the oil market into regional blocs. At present, we don’t have a single fluid structure anymore, but a European, Asian, and North American market. All of these parts are independently competing for a shrinking pool of accessible barrels, each with its own constraints and political priorities.
  
  While Asia is making headlines, Europe is having a very acute stress. The total continent, even the so-called pro-Russia parties, has spent the past two years restructuring its energy framework away from Russian hydrocarbons. Europe has shifted to a new reliance on seaborne imports from the Middle East, the United States, and West Africa. The closure of Hormuz and the loss of 13+ million bpd from the market include Gulf flows that were meant for Europe. The continent’s energy architecture is now hit at its heart. Even with maximum inflows from the United States, which has, until now, been able to maintain elevated export levels, this gap (crude oil and products) cannot be closed.
  
  At the same time, Europe’s refining landscape, after decades of lower investments or even closures, is not even optimized for all crude types. When trying to substitute Middle Eastern grades with alternatives, the refining sector faces technical and economic inefficiencies, which also directly result in the tightening of product markets. Diesel, already structurally short in Europe, is expected to be one of the first major casualties. Jet fuel and gasoline will follow, with knock-on effects across transport, industry, and ultimately consumer prices.
  
  For Asia, these challenges are severe but different. For the last few decades, Asia has been the largest importer of Middle Eastern crude. This dependency is even growing structurally. China and India, while benefiting from discounted Russian barrels, are not at present able to fully offset the loss of Gulf supplies. South Korea and Japan, with very limited domestic resources and high import dependencies, are highly exposed.
  
  While there is already a scramble for crude oil, fuels, and chemicals, it has not become very visible. Long-term contracts are being renegotiated, while spot markets are tightening, and logistical chains need to be rerouted at high costs. This shift is not only geographical but strategic. After decades of globalization and liberalization, energy security as a strategy and risk is back with a bang. It is now taking clear precedence over efficiency in the coming years, reversing decades of globalization in the oil trade.
  
  Still, these moves do not fully capture the scale of the disruption. Yes, logistics has become a major issue. However, the real issue is a present political issue.
  
  The assumption that the Strait of Hormuz can be reopened through negotiation is increasingly detached from reality. While diplomats and policymakers still believe in diplomacy, reality is totally different. The balance of power within Iran has shifted decisively towards the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an entity whose strategic calculus is fundamentally different from that of civilian policymakers. For the IRGC, control over Hormuz is not merely a bargaining chip; it is a central pillar of its regional power projection.
  
  Recent events underline this shift. At the same time that the Iranian government stated that the Strait is open again, IRGC reactions were 180 degrees in the opposite direction. The IRGC is no longer signaling its intentions; it is enforcing. Ships now require explicit approval to transit, and movements are dictated by military command rather than commercial logic. Conflicting statements from Iranian civilian officials and hardline commanders have exposed a fragmented state where diplomacy is performative. Still, control rests firmly with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the hardcore extremist fundamentalist military group controlling the country. Facts on the ground show that the IRGC has sidelined moderates and is driving an uncompromising strategy that rejects negotiations outright.
  
  Global oil market pundits, politicians, traders, and financials should understand and realize that this is not accidental. Iran’s approach has evolved into a deliberate long-war doctrine: selective closure, controlled escalation, and maximum economic pressure on global markets. The powers in Iran have been able to retain leverage by turning Hormuz into a managed chokepoint rather than a fully closed one. At the same time, Tehran’s hardcore powers now have leverage over the main artery of energy while avoiding outright military confrontation. In reality, it is an “all-or-nothing” strategy played over extended timelines. They are exploiting the West’s dependency on stable flows and its political aversion to sustained disruption. By using a layered maritime denial strategy, they can impose uncertainty and raise systemic costs.
  
  This introduces a third and perhaps most profound shift in oil markets. Price has been replaced by power as the primary determinant of oil flows. In history, in a functioning market, scarcity will lead to higher prices, which, in the end, turn into incentivized supply and demand destruction. However, when geopolitical actors physically constrain supply, the price will lose its balancing function. Said, there is no price at which a barrel can be delivered if the route itself is blocked.
  
  In such a reality, the oil market will not be clear but fractured. For all, when this happens, there is no immediate path back. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-04-21
  The U.S.-Iran Deal, The Deadline, and The $200 Per Barrel of Oil Question
  This week brings with it the 22 April deadline marking the end of the two-week ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran. The on-again/off-again/on-again closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Tehran, and Washington’s naval blockade specifically on Iranian ports,... Read more This week brings with it the 22 April deadline marking the end of the two-week ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran. The on-again/off-again/on-again closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Tehran, and Washington’s naval blockade specifically on Iranian ports, can broadly be seen as part of the ongoing negotiations for peace that began on 8 April, with the mood surrounding the talks having swung as wildly on both sides as the state of the blockades. Even before the recent spate of hostilities, mediating Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi declared that an “historic breakthrough” between the U.S. and Iran had been reached, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi underlining the positive progress. And U.S. President Donald Trump said just a few days ago that the two sides were on the cusp of a deal. That said, a senior European Union (E.U.) security source exclusively told OilPrice.com last week that there are serious rifts between Iran’s Foreign Ministry and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), with the latter far less willing to make key concessions than the former. And Trump has since stated that if a deal is not signed by the Wednesday, 22 April deadline, he “maybe won’t extend” the ceasefire and the U.S. will have to “start dropping bombs again”. In that case, another deadline will come into focus: 1 May is the legal deadline for President Trump to seek congressional approval to continue military operations under the ‘War Powers Act’, following the 60-day mark on 29 April. So, what are the likely scenarios here?
  
  One possible outcome is that no deal is reached by midweek, but the ceasefire is extended to allow for further negotiations. In this event, the E.U. source and a senior Washington-based legal source who works closely with the U.S. Treasury Department exclusively told OilPrice.com last week, the U.S. is likely to maintain a holding pattern on action. This will consist of continuing with its own blockade on Iranian ports, while further reinforcing its position off the south coast of Iran, with the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier en route to the area, having rounded the Cape of Good Hope very recently. Added to the U.S.’s other materiel nearby, Washington should have little practical trouble in continuing its blockade of Iran if its keeps doing so at a distance. “The guys [U.S. navy and other forces] can do everything they need to monitor and enforce the Iran blockade from the Arabian Sea, which is all they need to do to make Iran start to feel the economic pain of the closure,” said the Washington source. “To the same end, we’ve also decided not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports [that expired on 19 April], and we’re further extending financial sanctions on it too,” he added. “Both of these measures will also put more pressure on China, which has gotten a lot of its oil from Iran over the years [on the terms of the Comprehensive ‘25-year China-Iran Strategic Partnership’], and which up until our blockade of the [Iranian] ports was freely able to keep receiving it,” he added. In this scenario -- with blockades in place but talks still ongoing -- the E.U. source underlined that it would be highly likely that the U.S. would facilitate the full opening of the Strait of Hormuz sooner
  
  A less optimistic scenario is that no deal is reached by midweek, the ceasefire is not extended, and the U.S./Israel-Iran war resumes in full. “From the Iranian side, it would include the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the same for the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, attacks on the critical energy infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, attacks on key U.S. military and civilian targets in the region, and later attacks on key targets in the U.S., Israel, and in any countries associated with the U.S./Israel attacks,” said the E.U. source. “If it [Iran] goes down this route then we’d be looking at the bigger options from our side,” said the Washington source. “This includes the sort of infrastructure targeting the President referred to recently [including key bridges and civilian power plants], further targeted special military operations, and more sanctions, all designed to increase pressure on the current regime from inside and out,” he underlined. This scenario would be the one in which oil prices could easily go to the $200 per barrel level promised by Iran in the early stages of the war. Houston-based Vikas Dwivedi, global energy strategist at Macquarie Group, has assessed the possible impact of the war continuing until the end of June. “If the Strait [of Hormuz] were to stay closed for an extended period, prices would need to move high enough to destroy an historically large amount of global oil demand, with some countries, particularly in Asia, already facing physical shortages,” he underlined. “And with the global economy much less oil intensive than 50 years ago, we would not be surprised if that would require historically high real prices -- over $200 per barrel -- for a time, which would equate to a U.S. gasoline price of around $7 per gallon,” he concluded.
  
  Such a scenario would be extremely negative for the U.S. and politically disastrous for Trump, as fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Historical data highlights that every $10 pb change in the oil price results in around a 25-30 cent change in the price of a gallon of gasoline, and for every 1 cent per gallon that the average price of gasoline rises, more than $1 billion or so per year in consumer spending is lost -- causing economic damage. Politically speaking, since 1896 the sitting U.S. president has won re-election 11 times out of 11 if the economy was not in recession within two years of an upcoming election. However, sitting U.S. presidents who went into a re-election campaign with the economy in recession won only once out of seven occasions. Trump may still seek another term as President, but even if he does not, he does not want his political legacy to be defined by a failed Iran adventure as was Jimmy Carter’s, according to the Washington source. And, in any event, his Republican Party will want to optimise their chances for another of their members to be in the top job, which means keeping gasoline prices -- and therefore, oil prices -- at the low end.
  
  All this points to a deal being made at some point sooner rather than later, according to both the U.S. and E.U. sources, but what will it look like? Early in the conflict, Trump clearly laid out the four objectives he wants to achieve with the U.S.’s current actions against Iran and its proxies. In the order in which he said them, they started with making it impossible for Iran to build a nuclear arsenal and then moved on to degrading and destroying its missile stockpiles and production capabilities. Then came regime change and finally the end of the financing and arming of its proxies. All these aims were endorsed by every member of his cabinet. Moreover, all of them were in the draft of President Barack Obama’s original version of the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ (JCPOA, or colloquially ‘the nuclear deal’) agreed with Iran between 2013 and 2015, also detailed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. They remained the same in the version of the JCPOA that Trump and his team have been trying to negotiate with Iran ever since the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in May 2018.
  
  In terms of specifics, says the E.U. source, progress has been made on the key nuclear issue. “Iran has already agreed to a suspension if its uranium enrichment in principle, with the only difference being the duration -- five years against the 20-years now proposed as a minimum by Washington,” he told OilPrice.com over the weekend. “Iran has also agreed to dispose of its stockpile of enriched uranium in principle, with the only difference to the U.S. being that it wants to do so itself, whereas Washington wants the material handed over to it,” he added. “There is also agreement from Iran that it will in principle reduce its support for its proxies across the region, although in practical terms its ability to meaningfully support them for the foreseeable future looks very limited anyway,” he told OilPrice.com. “As of now, there’s not much movement on the issue of curtailing its ballistic missile resources, but there may soon be enough for Trump to extend the deadline for the negotiations further,” he concluded. Source: Oilprice.com

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