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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
637.50
0.00
635.00
-12.00
Dec 9
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	637.50	0.00	635.00	-12.00	Dec 9

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
404.43	-4.22	488.07	-3.63	758.17	-6.89	Dec 9

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MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)

Correlation between market bunker prices (MBP) and MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	Date
Rotterdam	353	408	-55	400	457	-57	635	674	-39	Dec 9
Singapore	355	404	-49	435	495	-60	660	667	-7	Dec 9
Fujairah	318	375	-57	423	485	-62	713	730	-17	Dec 9
Houston	357	388	-31	432	439	-7	645	677	-32	Dec 9

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Latest News
- 2025-12-09
  Oil eases 1% with Ukraine peace talks, US rate decision in spotlight
  Oil prices edged lower on Tuesday, after falling 2% in the previous session, with investors keeping a close eye on peace talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, concerns about ample supply and a looming decision on U.S. interest rates. Brent crude futures... Read more Oil prices edged lower on Tuesday, after falling 2% in the previous session, with investors keeping a close eye on peace talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, concerns about ample supply and a looming decision on U.S. interest rates.
  Brent crude futures fell 52 cents, or 0.83%, to $61.96 a barrel at 11:30 a.m. ET (1630 GMT). U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude dropped 62 cents, or 1.05%, at $58.26 a barrel.
  Both contracts fell by more than $1 a barrel on Monday after Iraq restored production at Lukoil’s West Qurna 2 oilfield, one of the world’s largest.
  Ukraine will share a revised peace plan with the U.S. after talks in London between its President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the leaders of France, Germany and Britain.
  "Many in the market don’t feel that Russia is serious about a peace agreement and they’re just simply buying time," said Andrew Lipow, president of Lipow Oil Associates.
  On Tuesday, power was out for roughly half of residents in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv after the latest Russian attacks on the country’s energy system.
  Aiming to cut Moscow’s oil revenue, the Group of Seven countries and the European Union are in talks to replace a price cap on Russian oil exports with a full maritime services ban, sources familiar with the matter said.
  The next International Energy Agency report should hold clues on the supply outlook.
  
  FOCUS TURNS TO IEA REPORT, FED DECISION
  "The next (market) driver is likely to be the IEA monthly oil market report for December, released on 11 December, which it has predicted a record surplus in the oil market in 2026, highlighted in previous outlook reports," said OANDA senior market analyst Kelvin Wong.
  If the IEA continues to flag surplus risk in the oil market in its December report, WTI crude could drift downwards to test the range support zone at $56.80 to $57.50 a barrel, he added.
  "(Brent) is being pushed towards the $60-line by the booming amount of oil at sea," said SEB’s chief commodities analyst Bjarne Schieldrop. "The only reason why Brent crude hasn’t fallen faster and deeper is because of the U.S. sanctions related to Rosneft and Lukoil."
  Also on the radar is the Federal Reserve’s policy decision due on Wednesday, with markets pricing in an 87% probability of a quarter-point rate reduction.
  
  Lower interest rates typically are a positive driver for oil demand given the decrease in borrowing costs, though some analysts were cautious about how much impact this could have on oil prices for now.
  "Although markets are largely invested in upcoming FED policy decision on Wednesday for a possible 25bp cut, something that could lend short-term support at the lower end of the $60–65 band, the broader price structure remains anchored by expectations of an oversupplied 2026 (oil market)," said Phillip Nova’s senior market analyst Priyanka Sachdeva. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2025-12-09
  Classification societies greenlight five Deltamarin vessel designs
  The LNG bunkering vessel will feature a 20,000-cbm tank capacity and be capable of supplying to larger vessels. The 9,500-cbm liquefied ethylene gas carrier will be powered by a combination of hybrid diesel-electric and wind-assisted propulsion. The... Read more The LNG bunkering vessel will feature a 20,000-cbm tank capacity and be capable of supplying to larger vessels.
  
  The 9,500-cbm liquefied ethylene gas carrier will be powered by a combination of hybrid diesel-electric and wind-assisted propulsion.
  
  The AiPs also cover an 8,000-TEU methanol-ready container vessel, although Deltamarin has not disclosed the specific level of methanol readiness.
  
  Methanol-ready means that a vessel will not be capable of running on methanol when delivered. It will have the option to be retrofitted for methanol propulsion in the future but will typically operate on conventional fuels until that conversion is carried out. Source: ENGIИE
- 2025-12-09
  Idemitsu Kosan and Kanematsu begin biofuel bunkering
  Idemitsu supplies heavy fuel oil that is blended with FAME biofuel sourced by Kanematsu. The blending takes place at an oil tank facility operated by Kanematsu subsidiary Kanematsu Yuso. The ISCC-certified bio-blends are then supplied to ships by barges... Read more Idemitsu supplies heavy fuel oil that is blended with FAME biofuel sourced by Kanematsu. The blending takes place at an oil tank facility operated by Kanematsu subsidiary Kanematsu Yuso.
  
  The ISCC-certified bio-blends are then supplied to ships by barges loading from Kanematsu Yuso's shipping facilities at its Kokura Oil Tank terminal.
  
  Idemitsu expects demand to rise and said it also plans to use its own shipping facilities, which can handle increased volumes.
  
  The biofuel blends are already being supplied to shipping companies like Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (K Line).
  
  The partners aim to supply a total of 5,000 mt of biofuel by March next year - both to ocean-going ships and to coastal vessels. That is equivalent to the amount of fuel consumed by a 300,000 dwt vessel operating for approximately 50 days, the company noted.
  
  This commercial launch follows successful operational tests conducted by Idemitsu on coastal vessels in Hokkaido between 2023-2024. The tests confirmed that ships were able to operate on this fuel with existing equipment, even in the cold Hokkaido region where the fuel risked solidifying.
  
  This bio-blend is expected have about 20% lower greenhouse gas emissions than conventional fuel, Idemitsu said.
  
  Idemitsu said it also plans to build a domestic bunker supply system for e-methanol. Source: ENGIИE
- 2025-12-09
  DP World unifies marine services brands under one global identity
  Dubai-headquartered DP World has announced the unification of its Marine Services brands – Unifeeder, P&O Ferrymasters and P&O Maritime Logistics – under a single DP World brand in a move designed to reinforce its position as ‘a fully integrated global... Read more
- 2025-12-09
  Stonewin awarded larger NATO bunker contract; appoints new bunker manager
  Petroleum products supplier Stonewin has announced an expansion of its role in the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) global marine fuels programme. In a statement sent to ship.energy last night (8 December), the company, which was set up in... Read more
- 2025-12-09
  Japanese trio begin first locally produced biofuel deliveries for shipping
  Idemitsu Kosan Co. is working with Kanematsu Corporation and Kanematsu Co. to produce and deliver a heavy fuel oil and fatty acids methyl ester (FAME) blended fuel for shipping, with the expectation that supply volumes could reach 5,000 tonnes by March... Read more
- 2025-12-09
  Ahti and ScanOcean partner on FuelEU Maritime pooling
  Swedish marine fuels supplier ScanOcean has entered an agreement with Finnish FuelEU Maritime compliance pool Ahti to offer a ‘pool-in-pool’ service to its customers. Under the deal, ScanOcean will market and sell a FuelEU Maritime pooling service... Read more
- 2025-12-09
  Oil edges down with Ukraine peace talks, US rate decision in spotlight
  Oil prices edged down on Tuesday, extending losses from the 2% drop in the previous session, with markets keeping a close eye on peace talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine and a looming decision on U.S. interest rates. Brent crude futures were down 8... Read more Oil prices edged down on Tuesday, extending losses from the 2% drop in the previous session, with markets keeping a close eye on peace talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine and a looming decision on U.S. interest rates.
  Brent crude futures were down 8 cents, or 0.1%, to $62.41 a barrel at 0409 GMT. U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude was at $58.75, down 13 cents, or 0.2%.
  Both contracts fell by more than $1 a barrel on Monday after Iraq restored production at Lukoil’s West Qurna 2 oilfield, one of the world’s largest.
  "Brent’s slip back toward the $62 (is) aligning seamlessly with the broader December narrative," said Phillip Nova’s senior market analyst Priyanka Sachdeva. "The noise around potential Iraqi disruptions faded overnight, and the market quickly reverted to its core theme of ample supply and cautious demand expectations."
  Ukraine will share a revised peace plan with the U.S. after talks in London between its President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the leaders of France, Germany and Britain.
  "Oil is keeping to a tight trading range until we get a better idea of which way the peace talks will go," KCM Trade chief market analyst Tim Waterer said.
  "If the talks break down, we expect oil to move higher, or if progress is made, and there is a likelihood of Russian supply to the global energy market resuming, prices would be expected to drop," he added.
  
  According to sources familiar with the matter, the Group of Seven countries and the European Union are in talks to replace a price cap on Russian oil exports with a full maritime services ban in a bid to reduce Russia’s oil revenue.
  Also on the radar is the Federal Reserve’s policy decision due on Wednesday, with markets pricing in an 87% probability of a quarter-point rate reduction.
  
  Lower interest rates typically are a positive driver for oil demand given the decrease in borrowing costs, though some analysts were cautious about how much impact this could have on oil prices for now.
  "Although markets are largely invested in upcoming FED policy decision on Wednesday for a possible 25bp cut, something that could lend short-term support at the lower end of the $60–65 band, the broader price structure remains anchored by expectations of an oversupplied 2026 (oil market)," said Phillip Nova’s Sachdeva. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2025-12-09
  Carbon Tax Puts EU at Odds With Export Majors
  On January 1 next year, a new tax will come into effect in the European Union. Dubbed the carbon border adjustment mechanism, the tax will be imposed on imports from non-EU countries with less strict emission reduction standards. Those countries are already... Read more On January 1 next year, a new tax will come into effect in the European Union. Dubbed the carbon border adjustment mechanism, the tax will be imposed on imports from non-EU countries with less strict emission reduction standards. Those countries are already speaking out against the tax—and the EU is about to face some unforeseen consequences.
  
  Last week, Reuters reported that Indian steel exporters were looking for new markets to replace the European Union, which currently absorbs as much as two-thirds of Indian steel exports. India’s steel manufacturing is done in blast furnaces fueled with coal, which is incompatible with the European Union’s emission reduction plans. Steel mills could switch to electric arc furnaces from coal-fired blast furnaces. The electric version has a lower emissions footprint, but such a switch would take time and money—quite a bit of it. Europe itself makes steel in electric arc furnaces, and this is still rather expensive.
  
  It was in response to European industries that the carbon border adjustment mechanism, or CBAM, was drafted in the first place. The EU’s strict emission reduction targets and the mandatory requirements that go with them were making European goods uncompetitive on international markets, hurting steelmakers, cement producers, carmakers, and all other industries, really. So, these industries spoke up and got this sort of a concession, which fits in perfectly with the European Union’s ambition to become a standard-setter in climate policies.
  
  “If you want to create a level playing field, if you are asking this [green standards] from companies in Europe, then it also makes sense to ask it from companies from outside of Europe [which are selling into the EU],” the EU’s climate commissioner, Wopke Hoekstra, told the Financial Times this month. Indeed, it makes sense to have one standard for all. Unfortunately, enforcement may not be as easy as Mr. Hoekstra made it sound in his interview with the Financial Times.
  
  “As people get used to it and it gets implemented, it will be less of a conversation,” Hoekstra claimed. That might be true for people in general, but for people running companies that depend on export revenues, things look a little bit differently. To comply with European standards in emission reduction, these specific people would need to spend a certain amount of money to transform their production process and make it more vulnerable to cost shocks because electric arc furnaces, as the name suggests, work with electricity rather than coal. This is arguably a big reason why European steelmakers are finding it difficult to compete: for each ton of carbon dioxide they emit, European industries have to pay some 80 euro, equal to over $93. Yet they do not really have a choice.
  
  India, China, and other exporters to the European Union do have a choice. “Some of those making money out of [fossil fuels] are seeking to prolong that process. We have seen this quite explicitly,” Wopke Hoekstra told the FT. “Some of the petrostates are seeking to at least slow down rather than speed up [the energy transition].” Indeed, most countries that make good money out of export commodities that enjoy strong and stable demand have very little motivation to kill their cash cows, as it were, just to please the policymakers in Brussels. It appears that Brussels is aware of it—and of the fact that the European Union is heavily dependent on imports of essential goods.
  
  Politico reported this month that while the CBAM was more or less done in terms of text, it still needed work in the emission measurement part. It was unclear as of yet how exactly the specific emissions of exporters to the EU from India, China, Saudi Arabia, and others “making money out of fossil fuels” were going to be measured. The publication said it had seen two documents on the emission measurement, one containing emission benchmarks and the other default value for the production of the goods that would be subject to the new tax from January. It also said there were signs of the EU circumventing its own rules to keep the imports flowing in.
  
  Politico cited industrial executives as saying the default values for emissions for certain countries that export to the EU were set too low to be real, including some steel production in China that, according to these estimates, turned out to be lower-emission than steel production in the EU.
  
  “Inconsistencies in the figures of default values and benchmarks would dilute the incentive for cleaner production processes and allow high-emission imports to enter the EU market with insufficient carbon costs,” an industry representative told Politico. “This could result in a CBAM that is not only significantly less effective but most likely counterproductive.”
  
  One could, in fact, argue that the CBAM is counterproductive by definition because it seeks to make more products expensive for more people in pursuit of an elusive goal of arresting changes in global temperatures. Yet the EU is going ahead with it, although it will provide “additional flexibilities” in response to the United States’ unfavorable reaction to the new levy. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2025-12-09
  The Energy Breakup Europe Can’t Enforce
  In recent weeks, the European Union has seemed to be upping the ante regarding its addiction to Russian hydrocarbons. Internal pressure and market realities seem to be forcing Brussels to close the door to Moscow, full stop. As indicated by the new agreement... Read more In recent weeks, the European Union has seemed to be upping the ante regarding its addiction to Russian hydrocarbons. Internal pressure and market realities seem to be forcing Brussels to close the door to Moscow, full stop. As indicated by the new agreement to phase out all Russian gas imports by 2027 and LNG by the end of 2026, European leaders reiterated that the EU is finally severing the last remaining pipelines, literal and political, that it still binds to Moscow. Even though all statements are emphatic, stating an ambitious timeline and an unmistakable intent, reality is still less positive than the media is presenting. Market data and political realities show that the expected divorce is less a clean break than another step on the long road of a protracted separation. Taking the latter position, both parties continue to live in the same house. Facts show that the total end of Russian oil and gas exports to Europe is, despite the rhetoric, far from reality, raising concerns about the true level of energy independence.
  
  Brussels’s latest decisions should have marked a historic turn. By adopting on December 3rd a phased ban on Russian natural gas, requiring LNG imports to cease by late 2026 and pipeline gas by 2027, Brussels wanted to show a clean break. For most, however, the package is just a new and logical extension of the earlier oil embargoes. All with a full intent to deprive Moscow of revenues that fuel its war on Ukraine, but again, it entailed a list of loopholes that already weaken it fully. As stated within hours of the EU announcement, pro-Russian member state Hungary said that it will challenge the regulation at the European Court of Justice. Budapest, currently perceived as a pro-Putin channel, claims that energy security falls squarely within national sovereignty. The Orban government also stated that Brussels had overstepped its own capabilities. Orban’s European friends, such as Slovakia, have also indicated that they are very unhappy or even totally opposed to it all. These disagreements create frustration and disappointment among EU members, complicating unified action on energy independence.
  
  While maybe the most straightforward explanation for the lack of success is to blame dissent, the package is weakened much more by other issues. The EU regulation itself is already perforated with exemptions and emergency clauses, all showing ample opportunity or outright allowing Russian gas to continue flowing, especially in case of a tight supply situation or if a member country faces disruptions. Looking at markets, these contingencies are not to be regarded as theoretical, but clear facts of everyday life. Winter demand spikes, LNG price volatility, or infrastructure outages could quickly trigger derogations that stretch into months. Again, new regulations are clearly taking the position Europe has been in before. As seen before, Europe’s temporary allowances have a habit of becoming structural features. The primary example of this is the Druzhba pipeline, which has received the exception since 2022. When the EU banned Russian crude, the pipeline was exempted, allowing Hungary and Slovakia to fill the gap so enthusiastically that their imports climbed above pre-war levels. This dynamic highlights how enforcement remains fragile and vulnerable to political and market pressures.
  
  At the same time, Russian energy supplies continue to reach Europe despite new legislation that neither regulates nor halts them. As reported in the media, roughly 16 BCM of Russian pipeline gas reached European customers via Turkstream throughout 2025. Most of these volumes target Hungary and several Balkan states. Even though these figures are just a fraction of the 175–180 BCM Russia supplied before the Ukraine invasion, they are still a substantial volume in a region where alternatives remain scarce. Russia is clearly using Turkey’s willingness to serve as the transit and blending hub, as Ankara takes advantage of discounted Russian gas, with total flows entering under so-called “non-Russian” origin certificates. Again, it is shown that reality is much more complex to change for Brussels than politicians recognize. Brussels can tighten paperwork; it cannot easily police the molecular pathways inside a multi-source, multi-directional pipeline system.
  
  When looking at LNG, the picture is even more ambiguous. Moscow’s LNG exports have dipped only marginally this year, showing a decline of just 2% year-on-year. This situation should worry Brussels, as Putin’s LNG volumes are still at 28.4 million tons between January and November. Brussels’s proposed LNG ban may eventually stem these flows, but Moscow still holds powerful cards. Russia can still use existing contracts, market demand, and the ability to re-route cargoes through global terminals to buffer any near-term negative impact on its pipeline gas situation. As reported, Russia’s November shipments increased by 10% from a year earlier, aided by fresh capacity from Arctic LNG 2. Even if the EU is willing to ban direct imports, the shadiness of the global LNG markets will still mitigate overall effects. It is still unclear how European member countries will try to block indirect LNG inflows, which are purchased by traders outside the EU and resold into European terminals. The current success of the global LNG market, which is liquid and offers options for origin masking, is now the primary constraint on achieving a very successful EU sanctions regime, or even on enforcing it fully.
  
  While natural gas or LNG is on the minds of most, oil is, however, a much more complicated story. At present, it is clear that oil is ostensibly further along in the sanctions ladder, while Europe’s exposure is complicated to say the least. At present, the EU and G7 partners are considering abandoning the price cap regime in favor of outright bans on maritime services for Russian oil. Theoretically, this could cut off the shipping capacity Moscow needs to move its barrels. Primary targets here are clearly India and China. When talking, however, to shipping analysts worldwide, all state that Moscow has been able to build an extensive “shadow fleet” of ageing tankers, obscure ownership arrangements, and non-Western insurers, which are mainly based in the UAE, Hong Kong, or smaller jurisdictions. All these vessels operate outside of the G7’s enforcement reach. Analysts also reiterated that these vessels are often involved in ship-to-ship transfers in opaque waters such as the Laconian Gulf or off the Canaries. Looking at this situation, it is clear that even if a maritime services ban would raise friction costs, it would not block Russia’s oil. The role of some G7 partners is also not yet clear, based on the news and vibes coming out of Washington.
  
  Devil’s advocates could argue that Europe is, in practice, sustaining Russia’s energy trade. Whether intentional or not, Europe’s role should not be underestimated. Despite a long list of sanctions, European companies still import large volumes of refined fuels from India and Turkey—fuels that are, in many cases, produced from Russian crude.
  
  Brussels’ attempt to curb this “laundering” of Russian oil by requiring certificates of origin from 2026 is unlikely to solve the problem. Oil is fungible, refineries can obscure feedstock origins with ease, and intermediaries have every incentive to disguise where the crude came from. Without intrusive audits of Indian and Turkish refineries—which the EU has no appetite for—this workaround will continue.
  
  All of this highlights a stark reality: Europe can legislate against Russian molecules, but Moscow can still sell them. The EU may sharply reduce its direct purchases of Russian oil and gas, but indirect flows, exemptions, political disputes, and third-country supply chains will keep Russia embedded in Europe’s energy system for years. Putin knows this.
  
  In fact, the current situation benefits the Kremlin more than Europe. The gradual phase-out gives Moscow exactly what it needs: time. Russia is already deepening its energy ties with China and India, which now absorb most of its crude. Brussels has also handed Moscow breathing room to expand LNG production—most notably via Arctic LNG 2—and to grow its shadow fleet and alternative financial systems insulated from Western sanctions. For Moscow, the EU’s 2027 deadline is a transition period, not a cut-off.
  
  Meanwhile, Europe’s own energy system reinforces the dependency. Gas remains both essential and increasingly difficult to source affordably. Norway is near peak output, Algeria is unreliable, and Azerbaijan cannot scale indefinitely. Europe has shifted its hopes to LNG, but even here Qatar has warned of possible shortages later in the decade. Rising Asian demand could tighten markets further. In such a landscape, Russian molecules—legal or laundered—retain undeniable strategic appeal. Some EU members will lobby, quietly or openly, for flexibility.
  
  The deeper risk is that Brussels begins believing its own narrative. Public claims of “ending dependence” mask a private reality of continued reliance. This self-deception could lead to underinvestment in new infrastructure, failure to secure long-term alternatives, or overuse of emergency clauses that quietly keep Russian flows alive. Such inconsistencies erode both strategy and credibility. A sanctions regime that claims to choke off Russian revenue while allowing leaks only strengthens the Kremlin.
  
  Europe has indeed reduced its exposure to Russian energy. Russian exports to the bloc are now a fraction of pre-war levels, and political will for further action is growing. Yet the gap between ambition and reality remains wide. Until that gap is closed, a complete end to Russian hydrocarbons remains an aspiration—not an accomplished fact.
  
  If Europe truly intends to break free, it needs a fundamentally different energy system from the one built over decades. Deadlines alone cannot change geology, markets, or trade routes. Moscow will exploit every loophole, every weak link, every transit hub, and every blended barrel to maintain access to Europe’s demand.
  
  Energy divorces are not declared—they are enforced. And enforcement, with all its messy technical and political challenges, is precisely where Europe still has a long way to go. Source: Oilprice.com

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