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MABUX ARA LNG Bunker Index
Port LNG$/mton MGO LS$/mton Date
ARA
904.00
-91.00
1 270.00
+10.00
Apr 20
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Port	LNG$/mton	MGO LS$/mton	Date
ARA	904.00	-91.00	1 270.00	+10.00	Apr 20

MABUX Global Bunker Index

380HSFO$/mton		VLS FO$/mton		MGO LS$/mton		Date
746.32	+2.39	882.27	+6.78	1 439.39	+7.81	Apr 27

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MABUX Market Differential Index (MDI)

Correlation between market bunker prices (MBP) and MABUX Digital Bunker Price Benchmark (DBP)

All Indexes in $/mton	380HSFO			VLS FO			MGO LS			Date
All Indexes in $/mton	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	MBP Index	DBP Index	MDI	Date
Rotterdam	635	732	-97	710	814	-104	1 270	1 389	-119	Apr 27
Singapore	678	761	-83	754	905	-151	1 340	1 382	-42	Apr 27
Fujairah	645	706	-61	780	874	-94	1 460	1 445	+15	Apr 27
Houston	638	701	-63	845	816	+29	1 205	1 236	-31	Apr 27

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Latest News
- 2026-04-27
  ClassNK approves Mitsubishi’s methane slip reduction technology
  Japanese classification society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK) has granted approval to a methane oxidation catalyst system jointly developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Marine Machinery & Equipment, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Daihatsu Infinearth to... Read more Japanese classification society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK) has granted approval to a methane oxidation catalyst system jointly developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Marine Machinery & Equipment, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Daihatsu Infinearth to curb methane slip from vessels.
  
  The system works by installing a methane oxidation catalyst in the exhaust stream of LNG-fuelled engines, where unburned methane is oxidised over the catalyst. Methane oxidation is a chemical reaction in which methane is converted into carbon dioxide (CO2) and water through reaction with oxygen.
  
  In LNG-powered engines, "methane slip—unburned methane released into the atmosphere—remains a challenge,” ClassNK said.
  
  Methane is a highly potent greenhouse gas, trapping 86 times more heat than CO2 over the first 20 years after its release, making it significantly more damaging in the near term, according to the United Nations Environment Programme.
  
  The global fleet of LNG-capable vessels currently stands at 921, with a further 679 ships expected to be delivered by 2033, according to classification society DNV.
  
  The new system has been installed as a demonstration unit on the LNG bunkering vessel KEYS Azalea, built by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, and is currently undergoing testing.
  
  Methane-reduction technologies are gaining traction among shipowners aiming to limit methane emissions.
  
  This month, climate tech firm Bennu Climate, together with lomarlabs, a subsidiary of UK-based shipping company Lomar Shipping, began sea trials of a system designed to remove methane during routine ship operations. Source: ENGIИE
- 2026-04-27
  Monjasa starts transition to ‘fully UAE-flagged regional fleet’ with the Monjasa Shaker
  Monjasa has announced that it has reflagged one of its three United Arab Emirates-based tankers from the Liberian registry to the UAE flag, and the other two vessels are expected to follow suit. In a statement dated today (27 April), the company said... Read more
- 2026-04-27
  IMO Secretary General urges MEPC 84 to ‘set an example of effective multilateralism’
  As the meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84) opens in London today, with an agenda which includes the next steps for the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Net Zero Framework (NZF), the UN agency’s Secretary General... Read more
- 2026-04-27
  Plaza Marine unveils new bunker barge service in New York
  Plaza Marine has informed ship.energy that it now has a new dedicated bunker barge service offering deliveries throughout the New York Harbor area. Speaking to ship.energy today (24 April), a company source said that Plaza Marine is currently using... Read more
- 2026-04-27
  APM Terminals and Hateco set to build new terminal in Vietnam’s Da Nang
  APM Terminals and Hateco Group have signed an agreement with Da Nang City to develop, build and operate a new terminal in Da Nang, central Vietnam. In a statement issued on Saturday (25 April), APM Terminals said that the agreement includes an estimated... Read more
- 2026-04-27
  Baleària marks 10 years of ‘sustained growth’ in Algeria
  Spain-headquartered ferry company Baleària has reported that it is looking to continue expanding its presence in Algeria, after marking its tenth anniversary in the country last week and posting record passenger numbers in 2025. In a statement issued... Read more
- 2026-04-27
  Oil prices end volatile session mixed but up sharply for the week on supply worries
  Oil prices whipsawed in volatile trade on Friday, but were higher on the week, as traders weighed supply disruptions against the potential restart of peace talks between the U.S. and Iran that could help limit those disruptions. Brent crude futures settled... Read more Oil prices whipsawed in volatile trade on Friday, but were higher on the week, as traders weighed supply disruptions against the potential restart of peace talks between the U.S. and Iran that could help limit those disruptions.
  Brent crude futures settled at $105.33 a barrel, rising 26 cents, or about 0.3%. U.S. West Texas Intermediate futures settled at $94.40 a barrel, falling $1.45, or 1.5%.
  For the week, Brent gained about 16% and WTI rose nearly 13%.
  Crude futures gave back early gains after Reuters reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi was expected to arrive in Islamabad late on Friday to discuss proposals for resuming peace talks with the U.S. after talks collapsed earlier this week.
  Prices fell further after CNN reported that U.S. President Donald Trump was sending special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Pakistan for talks with Iran’s foreign minister.
  Later, Trump told Reuters that Iran plans to make an offer aimed at satisfying U.S. demands.
  "They’re making an offer and we’ll have to see," Trump said.
  Early in the session, prices rose 2% on fears of renewed military escalation in the region, the day after Iran released footage of commandos boarding a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz, and as progress stalled on re-opening the vital waterway.
  "Traders are liquidating length ahead of an unusually unpredictable weekend and will readjust their positions Sunday night based on Iranian developments," said Tamas Varga of oil broker PVM.
  
  Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which before the war carried about a fifth of global oil output, remains effectively blocked. Iran’s capture of two cargo ships highlighted Washington’s difficulties in trying to control the passage.
  Only five ships, including an Iranian oil products tanker, have moved through the Strait of Hormuz in the past 24 hours, shipping data showed.
  On Thursday, U.S. President Donald Trump said Iran may have loaded up its weaponry "a little bit" during a two-week ceasefire, but added that the U.S. military could eliminate it in a single day. On Wednesday, he said he would indefinitely extend the ceasefire to allow for further peace talks.
  "As tensions have heightened this week since no meeting between the U.S. and Iran developed, an open-ended ceasefire will likely coincide with a continued conflict," said oil consultant Jim Ritterbusch of Ritterbusch and Associates.
  "This favors even higher prices especially in Brent and diesel, the more sensitive markets to a continuation of this war."
  Haitong Futures said in a report that if peace talks fail to make progress by the end of April and fighting resumes, oil prices could climb to new highs for the year. Source: Reuters/Investing.com
- 2026-04-27
  Destruction Threatens Global LNG Market
  The Middle East war is disrupting gas supply and driving demand destruction, with LNG imports—especially in Asia—falling sharply due to high prices and supply shortages. Short-term shocks risk becoming structural, as prolonged conflict could permanently... Read more The Middle East war is disrupting gas supply and driving demand destruction, with LNG imports—especially in Asia—falling sharply due to high prices and supply shortages.
  Short-term shocks risk becoming structural, as prolonged conflict could permanently alter demand patterns and delay or erase the expected global gas oversupply.
  Alternative suppliers can’t fully fill the gap, with U.S. LNG stepping in while African and other producers remain underutilized, prolonging market tightness.
  The impact of the war in the Middle East could lead to structural demand destruction on the world’s natural gas markets, the head of the Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum warned in the latest sign of the far-reaching impacts of the hostilities between the United States and Israel, and Iran.
  
  The war has already disrupted international gas flows because of the Strait of Hormuz closure and the strikes on energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, which were Iran’s retaliation for U.S. and Israeli strikes that began at the end of February. Resumption of gas exports would take months, according to the GECF’s Philip Mshelbila—if the war ends soon. If it drags on, however, the effects of the supply disruption could become permanent.
  
  “If the conflict ended today, the world would recover in six months to a year. But if it lasts six months, those knee-jerk changes we are seeing could become structural,” Mshelbila said, speaking at an industry event in Paris, as quoted by Reuters.
  
  The executive also recalled that most predictions for the gas market saw it flipping into oversupply this year. The glut was, according to analysts, going to be the result of new capacity coming online in the United States while demand grows more slowly. “Clearly this conflict has done something ‌to that, and it's not yet clear whether it's just a delay, or whether in fact that glut will ever come,” the secretary-general of the Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum said.
  
  Even if a glut comes, it will not be coming anytime soon. The latest data for Asia suggests that imports of liquefied natural gas are on course to record their lowest monthly level in close to six years, Reuters’ Clyde Russell reported this week. The numbers come from Kpler and are evidence of demand destruction resulting from the war. In some cases, this is voluntary demand cuts, such as in the case of China, for instance. In others, such as Pakistan, the destruction is organic, prompted by the higher prices that LNG is fetching amid the supply cuts.
  
  Asia is set to import some 19.03 million tons of liquefied gas this month, which would be down from 20.69 million tons for March and a seasonal high of 26.34 million tons for December 2025, the Kpler data showed. For China, however, the drop is much more marked, with the April total seen at 3.36 million tons. That would be down from 7.66 million tons for December 2025 and the lowest since April 2018, Reuters’ Russell noted.
  
  With Qatari LNG mostly gone, importers are switching to U.S. gas and, to a lesser extent, Russian gas. Volumes from other producers are not changing, even though they have the resources, GECF’s Philip Mshelbila noted.
  
  “Sadly while some African countries have excess capacity in both LNG and pipeline gas, the majority of them if not all are not producing at full capacity,” he said, adding that “If you look at the export pipelines to Europe, from Algeria or from Libya, not one of them is full.” Because of this, it is U.S. liquefied that is replacing most of the lost volumes from the Middle East.
  
  The executive pointed out that this is because African LNG producers are operating below capacity, without elaborating on the reasons for that. However, Nigeria has been exporting more LNG to Asia since the war in the Middle East began, and there are plans in place to boost the capacity of its LNG plant from 22 million tons to 30 million tons.
  
  Algerian gas deliveries to Europe are also on the rise—even before the war began. Last year, Algeria exported a total 39-40 billion cu m of natural gas via pipeline and as LNG. That represented 13 to 14% of Europe’s total gas imports, Euronews reported recently, comparing it to 12 billion cu m in Qatari gas imports, which translates into a share of between 7% and 9% of total gas imports.
  
  The problem comes from the fact that Algeria could not boost its exports to Europe fast enough to plug the hole left by the force majeure at QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan complex. Yet the North African country is making steps in that direction: earlier this week, Algiers launched an oil and gas tender for seven blocks, with bids due by November. This is part of the government’s plan to increase natural gas production to 200 billion cu m annually by 2030. The investment required to do this is estimated at between $50 and $60 billion.
  
  Yet these are long-term plans, while the supply pain is quite immediate. It is this immediacy of the problem that could transform into chronic demand weakness. “Normally in a situation of crisis this is an opportunity: Fill it up! Seize the market! Unfortunately, we are missing out, because we don't have the upstream molecules to fill the infrastructure,” GECF’s Mshelbila said. “The reserves are there, but they are still in the ground.” Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-04-27
  The Green Hydrogen Dream Is Slipping Further Out of Reach
  Green hydrogen gained significant traction during the post-pandemic period, as governments worldwide pledged to decarbonise their economies and energy companies looked to diversify their portfolios. Hydrogen produced using renewable energy as an input... Read more Green hydrogen gained significant traction during the post-pandemic period, as governments worldwide pledged to decarbonise their economies and energy companies looked to diversify their portfolios. Hydrogen produced using renewable energy as an input looked like the best way to provide a clean alternative to traditional fuels, as it can be used for a range of applications, including decarbonising hard-to-abate industries. However, many green hydrogen projects are now lagging behind as energy companies scale back their climate plans and governments fail to achieve decarbonisation goals.
  
  Green hydrogen is produced using renewable electricity to power an electrolyser, which splits water into hydrogen and oxygen. The gas is then burned to produce power, emitting only water vapour and warm air, making it carbon-free. This contrasts with grey and blue hydrogen production, which are powered by natural gas.
  
  According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global hydrogen demand reached 100 Mt in 2024, marking a 2 percent demand increase from 2023. Demand was driven by refineries, the production of chemicals, and the iron and steel sector. Most hydrogen is produced using fossil fuels, using 290 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 90 million tonnes of coal equivalent a year.
  
  During the early 2020s, the widespread support for a global green transition drove companies to announce hundreds of green hydrogen projects, despite the fuel still being in the nascent stage of development. Governments targeted a cumulative electrolysis capacity of 190 GW by 2030, according to the IEA’s Global Hydrogen Review 2022. While the global green hydrogen capacity has grown, from just 0.7 GW in 2022 to a capacity potential of around 4 GW in 2025, this is still far below the global target.
  
  Some companies have been deterred from developing green hydrogen projects due to the barriers to new products entering the market, including high costs and a lack of adequate regulation and infrastructure, according to the IEA. In addition, due to the lack of experience in developing commercial-scale green hydrogen projects, several companies have faced delays in development.
  
  Reports of project delays, cancellations, and downward revisions of green hydrogen output targets have exacerbated concerns that green hydrogen could have been an overhyped trend. According to a 2025 study, just 7 percent of global green hydrogen capacity announcements were completed on schedule, out of 190 projects monitored over three years. However, research by the IEA suggests that many green hydrogen projects are still being developed, albeit at a slower pace.
  
  Green hydrogen is now expected to contribute around 4 percent of the total global hydrogen production by 2030, compared to less than 1 percent today. However, green hydrogen output has the potential to grow beyond current estimates by the end of the decade, to 6 Mt of low-emissions hydrogen production, depending on political will and investment in projects. Achieving this production by 2030 will require policy action to overcome barriers, with a focus on closing the cost gap between green hydrogen and other fossil fuels.
  
  The Industrias Cachimayo plant in Peru became the world’s largest electrolyser in 2020, at 25 MW, and several major projects are currently in the works, such as Envision Energy’s 500 MW electrolysis project in China and Saudi Arabia’s 2.2 GW NEOM Green Hydrogen Project, which is expected to be operational by 2027. There is a global project pipeline of more than 15 Mt of green hydrogen production, with most planned for after 2030. China, Europe, India, and North America contribute almost 90 percent of the committed production to 2030.
  
  One of the main barriers to expanding green hydrogen operations is the high cost associated with the production of the fuel. Green hydrogen production is between three- and five-times higher on average than that of grey hydrogen. However, a recent breakthrough in technology could drive down production costs, according to a 2025 Interesting Engineering report.
  
  The new system, developed by a joint team from China Agricultural University and Nanyang Technological University, uses sugars derived from agricultural waste (such as wheat stalks) in place of oxygen, which makes the overall production cycle much cheaper than conventional methods, at just $1.54 per kilo.
  
  Green hydrogen is particularly attractive to heavy industries in the hard-to-abate emissions segment, as decarbonisation relies on the use of clean fuel, as it cannot simply shift to renewable electricity. However, justifying the use of renewable electricity for green hydrogen production, rather than using it directly to provide clean power, is difficult.
  
  Nevertheless, without green hydrogen or an alternative clean fuel, it will be difficult for many industries to significantly reduce emissions. Therefore, the creation of favourable government policies and economic incentives could support the accelerated deployment of green hydrogen projects to power heavy industry.
  
  While the development of the global green hydrogen sector has been complicated, with several barriers arising in recent years, there is still hope for a delayed expansion of the sector to support meaningful decarbonisation efforts in some of the most hard-to-abate industries. Source: Oilprice.com
- 2026-04-27
  The Strait of Hormuz May Reopen, But the System Has Already Broken
  The market will panic when the Strait of Hormuz closes. When it reopens, policymakers will all feel relieved. At present, we are all witnessing this in real time, but reality is definitely the opposite. The latest data coming out in April 2026 should... Read more The market will panic when the Strait of Hormuz closes. When it reopens, policymakers will all feel relieved. At present, we are all witnessing this in real time, but reality is definitely the opposite. The latest data coming out in April 2026 should put an end to that illusion. Even after repeated announcements by Iran and the USA that Hormuz was “open,” real-time, actual maritime traffic only shows evidence of a near collapse. Markets are still struggling to get to grips with the fact that, during the opening of Hormuz, vessel traffic levels are still extremely low, sometimes as low as three vessels per day, compared to well over 120–140 in normal conditions. The lesson to be taken into account is no longer theoretical. The reopening of a chokepoint, such as Hormuz or Bab El Mandab, does not restore a system. It merely exposes how deeply it has already been broken.
  
  Markets and policymakers should look at the precedent already set in the Bab El-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. Despite intermittent stabilization efforts, traffic through the Red Sea corridor remains structurally depressed, even after years of reopening, with Suez throughput still far below pre-crisis levels. It has become clear that incentives such as transit fee discounts are widely failing to bring vessels back. The Houthis did not need to close the corridor permanently; they needed to make it all unreliable. That alone was enough to rewire global shipping behavior.
  
  Hormuz is now following the same trajectory, but this time at a far greater scale.
  
  The hard data is unequivocal. Maritime traffic through Hormuz has at times fallen by 90% or more, with entire fleets idling outside the Strait rather than risk transit. At the same time, most attention is focused on hydrocarbon exports, as oil exports from core Gulf producers have dropped by over 60%, while millions of barrels have been pushed into floating storage. Traffic has effectively fallen to zero, especially during peak disruption periods. Hundreds of vessels are still waiting in the Gulf of Oman and beyond. No reversal of this dynamic has been witnessed even during brief reopenings. Tankers turn back. Shipping lines refuse bookings. Insurance markets remain restrictive.
  
  The core issue is trust, not just a closure. Recognizing this helps policymakers and industry leaders feel the gravity and urgency of restoring confidence.
  
  There needs to be an understanding that shipping is not governed by physical access alone, but by risk perception. Once that perception shifts, as is now the case in Hormuz, the system behaves differently. The withdrawal of war-risk insurance in early March effectively shut down commercial navigation, regardless of whether the Strait was technically open. Even now, when some parties have stated that the strait has been partially reopened at certain times, major operators still refuse to transit. In some cases, none of the world’s top shipping companies are willing to take cargo through the Strait.
  
  That behavioral shift is the real story. And this confirms and substantiates what we have already seen in the Red Sea.
  
  The consequences are structural, as evidenced by global trade rerouting on a scale. The Cape of Good Hope has become the default alternative for Asia–Europe flows, adding 10–14 days and thousands of nautical miles to voyages. All parties should realize that this is no longer a temporary detour but is already embedded in network design. Shipping lines are recalibrating schedules, redeploying fleets, and locking in new routing strategies that assume chokepoint instability as a baseline.
  
  The implications for energy markets are and will increasingly become profound. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries roughly 20% of global oil and LNG flows. Its disruption has already triggered what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply shock in modern oil market history. Hydrocarbon prices have surged, while total exports have collapsed. Supply chains have seized up. The longer-term impact will not only be scarcity, but fragmentation.
  
  Even if Hormuz fully reopens tomorrow, flows will not simply revert.
  
  The history and outcome of the Red Sea crisis prove this. Despite periods of reduced attacks, shipping companies have not fully resumed operations through the Suez Canal. There is a quite simple reason for this: reliability has been broken. Once operators have redesigned their networks to use alternative routes, they do not revert overnight. Contracts are rewritten. Insurance frameworks are reset. Risk models are updated. The global system has adapted and is locked into that adaptation.
  
  Hormuz's larger scale and deeper consequences underscore the urgent need for policymakers and analysts to understand the profound systemic shifts underway.
  
  First, insurance markets will not normalize quickly. War-risk premiums have surged, fundamentally altering voyage economics. Even in de-escalation scenarios, insurers will price in disruption risks, resulting in a lasting cost uplift for Gulf exports. Shipping behavior will remain cautious or risk-averse, as vessel owners demand higher returns or avoid the region altogether, affecting long-term strategic planning.
  
  Third, energy buyers will diversify aggressively. Europe, already reshaped by the loss of Russian pipeline gas, will accelerate sourcing from the Atlantic basin and Africa. Asia will double down on diversification strategies, including U.S. LNG and regional supply chains. For the Gulf, this doesn’t mean that its market share will disappear. Its dominance, however, is expected to be structurally diluted.
  
  Fourth, infrastructure investment will shift toward alternative export routes, including pipelines to the Red Sea, storage hubs outside chokepoint zones, and new transshipment models. These investments, driven by the crisis, are long-term and irreversible, representing a fundamental reconfiguration of global energy logistics that industry stakeholders must consider in their strategic planning.
  
  At the same time, geopolitical implications are intensifying. The events of 2026 have demonstrated that chokepoints are no longer passive geographic features. They have become, and will continue to be, used as active instruments of power. The ability to disrupt Hormuz or Bab El-Mandeb, even temporarily, confers strategic leverage far beyond traditional military capabilities. This will incentivize further militarization of maritime corridors and increase the probability of recurring disruptions. Bab El Mandab, Malacca Straits, and others will need to be reassessed without any doubt.
  
  The private sector has already internalized this reality. Shipping lines, traders, and financiers are no longer pricing risk based on stability but on volatility. The result is a system that prioritizes resilience over efficiency. That shift has profound economic consequences.
  
  Globalization was built on the assumption of frictionless maritime trade. Chokepoints like Hormuz and Suez were treated as stable constants. Since February 2026, this assumption has been obsolete. The new model is one of managed instability, where redundancy replaces optimization and cost structures rise accordingly.
  
  For Egypt, one of the main targets of the fallout, the warning is already visible. The collapse in Suez Canal revenues is not just a cyclical downturn; it has become a structural shock. Traffic was rerouted, and it is not fully returning. The same risk now hangs over the Gulf. Even if Hormuz reopens and remains technically secure, its reliability premium has been permanently damaged.
  
  For Europe, the stakes are acute. Increased reliance on seaborne energy imports exposes the continent to maritime disruption at precisely the moment when industrial resilience is already under pressure. For Asia, especially China, India, Japan, and South Korea, the exposure is even greater, as they all largely depend on Gulf hydrocarbons. Both regions will face higher costs, greater volatility, and more complex supply chains. Economic pressure, financial burdens, and instability could pose serious issues in the future.
  
  The most dangerous mistake policymakers can make now is to treat reopening as a resolution. The data shows otherwise. Traffic does not return. Costs do not normalize. Behavior does not revert. The system evolves.
  
  Even today, vessels are still turning back, traffic remains minimal, and operators are staying away. This is the new reality: chokepoints can reopen physically while remaining closed economically.
  
  The long-term consequence is clear. The global maritime and energy system is entering a phase of structural fragmentation. Global trade and energy flows will be more regional, more redundant, and more expensive. Efficiency has given way to resilience. The price of security will be permanently embedded in trade.
  
  Hormuz, like Bab El-Mandeb, is no longer just a passage. It is a fault line. Once that has shifted, it does not simply move back. Source: Oilprice.com

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